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DISCHARGE Is GENERALLY NOT
A TANGIBLE EMPLOYMENT ACTION,
THEREBY NOT PRECLUDING THE Ellerthi
Faragher Affirmative Defense-Reed v.
MBNA Marketing Systems, Inc.
Marc A. Hearron
N Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth1 and Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton,2 the United States Supreme Court clarified the rules regarding
employer liability for sexual harassment by a supervisor. The court
held that, in general, the employer is liable, but when there is no tangible
employment action 3 the employer may assert an affirmative defense to
vicarious liability.4 Left undetermined by the court was whether con-
structive discharge 5 would preclude the employer from raising the affirm-
ative defense, and the circuit courts of appeal are split on this issue.6 The
First Circuit recently decided in Reed v. MBNA Marketing Systems, Inc.
that constructive discharge does not generally preclude the defense but
1. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
2. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
3. "A tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in employment sta-
tus, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different re-
sponsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at
761.
4. Id. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08.
5. "A constructive discharge occurs when an employee resigns his or her current po-
sition because the employee considers the conditions intolerable and a reasonable em-
ployee also would have found the conditions made remaining in the job unbearable."
Robinson v. Sappington, No. 02-3316, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 24723, at *47-48 (7th Cir.
Dec. 9, 2003).
6. Compare Caridad v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 294 (2d Cir. 1999)("[C]onstructive discharge does not constitute a 'tangible employment action,' as that term
is used in Ellerth and Faragher."), with Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 461 (3d Cir. 2003),
cert. granted, sub nom. Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 803 (Dec. 1, 2003)(No. 03-95) ("[A] constructive discharge, when proved, constitutes a tangible employment
action within the meaning of Ellerth and Faragher.").
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that in rare circumstances it may do So. 7 However, following Ellerth and
Faragher, once constructive discharge is proved, the affirmative defense
should not be available, and Reed's contrary holding, although seemingly
pro-defendant, actually harms the employer by shifting the burden of
proof to the defendant-employer.
Bobbi-Lyn Reed, a seventeen-year-old female, began working as a
telemarketer for MBNA in June 1999, reporting to William Appel. 8
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Reed, Appel began mak-
ing sexually motivated comments toward Reed shortly after her employ-
ment began.9 In August 1999, after Reed babysat for Appel one evening
in Appel's home, "Appel came up behind [Reed], put his arm around her
neck and dragged her into the living room where he pressed her to per-
form oral sex on him." 10 At Appel's insistence, Reed did not report the
incident." After the comments continued, she left MBNA in the fall of
1999 without having reported Appel's behavior to anyone at MBNA.12
Reed returned to work at MBNA in May 2000, with Appel as her super-
visor again, and the harassment quickly resumed until finally, in August
2000, Reed reported Appel's behavior to MBNA officials. 13 "MBNA be-
gan an investigation that day leading swiftly to a decision to terminate
Appel. Appel resigned before the paperwork for his dismissal could be
completed.' 14
Reed sued MBNA on December 11, 2001, claiming that she was sub-
jected to a hostile work environment and that she was constructively dis-
charged when she left MBNA in 1999.15 The district court found that
Reed had been subjected to a hostile work environment, but it granted
summary judgment for MBNA on the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative de-
fense, finding that Reed was unreasonable in not reporting her harass-
ment to company officials. 16 Furthermore, the court held that Reed's
claim of constructive discharge did not preclude the affirmative defense
because constructive discharge is not a tangible employment action.' 7 On
appeal, MBNA did not deny the hostile work environment claim; how-
ever, it denied vicarious liability, relying on the affirmative defense. 18
The First Circuit agreed with the district court's holding that constructive
discharge is not a tangible employment action and allowed MBNA's as-
7. 333 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2003).
8. Id. at 30.
9. The comments included compliments on her appearance, references to Appel's ex-
girlfriend, and "dropp[ing] green M&M's on Reed's desk claiming that they would make
[her] horny." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
10. Id.
11. Id.






18. Id. at 32.
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sertion of the affirmative defense.19 However, it reversed the district
court's grant of summary judgment for MBNA on the merits of the de-
fense and remanded the case to the district court.20
The Supreme Court first recognized sexual harassment as a violation of
Title VII in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson.21 However, it stated
that the employer is not always liable for a hostile work environment;
traditional rules of agency law apply when determining employer liabil-
ity.22 Ellerth and Faragher clarified how agency law is to be applied in the
sexual harassment context by holding the following:
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee
for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with
immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee.
When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer
may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to
proof by a preponderance of the evidence.... The defense comprises
two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable
care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behav-
ior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by
the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.... No affirmative defense
is available, however, when the supervisor's harassment culminates
in a tangible employment action.2 3
The court defined tangible employment action as "a significant change in
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment
with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a signifi-
cant change in benefits. '2 4
The court's analysis in Ellerth and Faragher relies on principles of
agency law as stated in the Restatement (Second) of Agency. The court
quoted section 219(2) of the Restatement, which defines when a master is
liable for the actions of his servants when the servant is not acting within
the scope of his duties: (1) the intent standard ("the master intended the
conduct or the consequences"), (2) the negligence standard ("the master
was negligent or reckless"), and (3) the aided in the agency relation stan-
dard ("the servant ... was aided in accomplishing the tort by the exis-
tence of the agency relation").2 5 The aided in the agency relation
19. Id. at 33.
20. Id. at 37.
21. 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an em-
ployer from "fail[ing] or refus[ing] to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)
(2003).
22. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB, 477 U.S. at 72.
23. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08.
24. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761. The court also noted that "[a] tangible employment action
in most cases inflicts direct economic harm." Id. at 762.
25. Id. at 758 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1957)). The
court also mentioned a fourth standard: "the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the
master." Id. However, this standard is not relevant to the analysis here.
2004]
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standard was the primary basis for the new tangible employment action
rule: "When a supervisor makes a tangible employment decision, there is
assurance the injury could not have been inflicted absent the agency rela-
tion .... [O]nly a ... person acting with the authority of the company[ ]
can cause this sort of injury."'26 Thus, once a tangible employment action
is proved, the aided in the agency standard for vicarious liability is also
automatically proved. However, even without a tangible employment ac-
tion, there is still vicarious liability unless the employer can prove the
elements of the affirmative defense. 27
On the surface, constructive discharge seems to lie in the twilight zone
between a simple hostile work environment and a tangible employment
action. The Supreme Court has not defined constructive discharge, but
circuit courts have required, at a minimum, a hostile work environment
where working conditions are so intolerable that a reasonable employee
would feel compelled to resign.28 The resignation is treated as if the em-
ployer actually discharged the employee.29 Some circuits require that the
employer must have intended for the employee to resign;30 however,
many circuits require only foreseeability-that the employer knew or
should have known that the employee felt compelled to resign. 31 As part
of the requirement of a reasonable employee, courts require that the em-
ployee gave the "employer a reasonable opportunity to correct the prob-
lem," but that the intolerable conditions continued.32
The circuit courts of appeal are split as to whether constructive dis-
charge precludes the EllerthiFaragher affirmative defense. The Second
Circuit, the first circuit court to rule on this issue, determined that a con-
structive discharge is not a tangible employment action,33 and the Sixth
Circuit has agreed.34 The Second Circuit, considering only the aided in
the agency relation standard, not the intent or negligence standards, rea-
soned, "[C]o-workers, as well as supervisors, can cause the constructive
discharge of an employee. And, unlike demotion, discharge, or similar
economic sanctions, an employee's constructive discharge is not ratified
or approved by the employer."'35 The Third and Eighth Circuits have dis-
26. Id. at 761-62.
27. See id. at 766. Prior to Ellerth and Faragher, the plaintiff had the burden of prov-
ing employer liability as part of the prima facie case for hostile work environment. Ellerth
and Faragher shift the burden to the employer to prove the affirmative defense to escape
vicarious liability.
28. See, e.g., Jaros v. LodgeNet Entm't Corp., 294 F.3d 960, 965 (8th Cir. 2002).
29. Caridad v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 295 (2d Cir. 1999).
30. E.g., Tidwell v. Meyer's Bakeries, Inc., 93 F.3d 490, 494 (8th Cir. 1996).
31. Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 444 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. granted, sub nom. Pa. State
Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 803 (Dec. 1, 2003) (No. 03-95).
32. Jackson v. Ark. Dep't of Educ., Vocational & Technical Educ. Div., 272 F.3d 1020,
1027 (8th Cir. 2001).
33. Caridad, 191 F.3d at 294; see also Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 128 (2d
Cir. 2003).
34. See Turner v. Dowbrands, Inc., No. 99-3984, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 15733, at *4
(6th Cir. June 26, 2000).
35. Caridad, 191 F.3d at 294.
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agreed.36 In holding that constructive discharge is a tangible employment
action, the Third Circuit reasoned that a constructive discharge is "the
functional equivalent of an actual termination"; it "constitutes a signifi-
cant change in employment status, by ending the employer-employee re-
lationship"; and it inflicts "direct economic harm."'37 Moreover,
"removing constructive discharge from the category of tangible employ-
ment actions could have the perverse effect of discouraging an employer
from actively pursuing remedial measures and of possibly encouraging
intensified harassment. '38
In Reed, the First Circuit declined to declare a bright-line rule. Instead,
it declared that, in general, "the constructive discharge label cannot be
used to preclude the affirmative defense; but possibly, on rare facts, it
might be appropriate for that purpose. '39 The court concluded that the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Ellerth for not allowing the affirmative de-
fense when there has been a tangible employment action is that "a super-
visor who takes official action against an employee should be treated as
acting for the employer. ' 40 The court held that since all of Appel's ac-
tions were "exceedingly unofficial and involved no direct exercise of com-
pany authority," they were "exactly the kind of... conduct for which the
affirmative defense was designed. 4
1
The First Circuit's reasoning in Reed is flawed in several respects. First,
constructive discharge does fit within Ellerth's definition of tangible em-
ployment action. Ellerth lists several examples of tangible employment
actions. Although the list does not specifically name constructive dis-
charge, 42 it defines tangible employment action as "a significant change in
employment status,"'43 a definition in which constructive discharge clearly
fits since the employer-employee relationship is terminated.44 Moreover,
Ellerth did list discharge as an example of a tangible employment action,
and constructive discharge is a type of discharge; it is treated under the
36. See Suders, 325 F.3d at 461; Jaros, 294 F.3d at 966; Jackson, 272 F.3d at 1026.
37. Suders, 325 F.3d at 460 (internal quotation marks omitted).
38. Id. at 461.
39. Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., Inc., 333 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2003). The court's refusal
to declare a bright-line rule, and its failure to give examples of what "rare facts" may
preclude the affirmative defense serve only to add confusion to an already confusing issue.
Following the court's reasoning, it is difficult to conceive of a constructive discharge con-
text in which the court would disallow the assertion of the defense.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See supra text accompanying note 3. At least one court believes that the Supreme
Court's failure to include constructive discharge in its clearly non-exhaustive list of tangible
employment actions is dispositive. See Powell v. Morris, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1019 (S.D.
Ohio 1999).
43. See supra text accompanying note 3.
44. Ellerth also noted that with tangible employment actions, the employee generally
suffers direct economic harm. Supra text accompanying note 24. Under constructive dis-
charge, the employee suffers from a direct economic harm since he or she no longer re-
ceives income from the employer. Thus, it more closely resembles termination and other
tangible employment actions than it does simple hostile work environment, where the em-
ployee stays on the job with no economic injury.
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law as if the employer terminated the employee.45
Second, the First Circuit misinterpreted Ellerth and Faragher's reason-
ing for excluding the affirmative defense from tangible employment ac-
tion cases. The court focused on the following statement in Ellerth: "[A]
supervisor who takes official action against an employee should be
treated as acting for the employer. ' 46 Since constructive discharge is not
necessarily an official action by the supervisor, the court permitted the
affirmative defense. However, the statement on which the court relied
only refers to one situation when vicarious liability is to be imposed; it
does not describe every situation when the affirmative defense is to be
excluded. Ellerth's actual reasoning for not allowing the affirmative de-
fense when there has been a tangible employment action is that in those
circumstances "there is assurance the injury could not have been inflicted
absent the agency relation. '47 It is guaranteed that the aided in the
agency relation standard for imposing vicarious liability is met in the case
of a tangible employment action; therefore, there is no reason to allow an
affirmative defense. It follows that in situations where the intent or negli-
gence standard is necessarily met that there is also no reason to allow the
affirmative defense.
Third, the intent and negligence standards for imposing vicarious liabil-
ity will always lead to employer liability in the case of a constructive dis-
charge. Although Ellerth naturally focused on the aided in the agency
relation standard when considering tangible employment actions, the Su-
preme Court did not reject the use of the Restatement's intent and negli-
gence standards. In fact, Ellerth reiterated Meritor's holding that
traditional agency principles-as stated in the Restatement-must ap-
ply.48 In those circuits that require as an element of constructive dis-
charge that the employer intended the employee to resign, the intent
standard is always met. Likewise, in those circuits that require mere fore-
seeability, that the employer knew or should have known that the condi-
tions were so intolerable that the employee would resign, the negligence
standard is always met.49 Therefore, applying traditional agency princi-
ples as stated in the Restatement (Second) of Agency, a valid claim of
constructive discharge always leads to employer liability. This is the very
reason the Ellerth court did not permit the affirmative defense when
there is a tangible employment action-in such a case "it would be im-
plausible to interpret agency principles to allow an employer to escape
liability." 50
Allowing the affirmative defense for a constructive discharge actually
makes it more difficult for the employer to escape vicarious liability. In
45. Caridad v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 295 (2d Cir. 1999).
46. Reed, 333 F.3d at 33 (emphasis added).
47. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761-62.
48. See id. at 758-59.
49. "An employer is negligent with respect to sexual harassment if it knew or should
have known about the conduct and failed to stop it." Id. at 759.
50. Id. at 763.
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order for a plaintiff to prove constructive discharge, he or she must essen-
tially disprove at least one element of the affirmative defense. First, the
plaintiff must prove that the employer knew or should have known that
conditions were intolerable but failed to stop it; this often disproves the
first element of the affirmative defense, that the employer exercised rea-
sonable care. Second, the plaintiff must prove that he or she was reason-
able in feeling compelled to resign; this always disproves the second
element of the affirmative defense, that the plaintiff unreasonably failed
to take advantage of corrective opportunities offered by the employer. In
a cause of action for constructive discharge, the plaintiff bears the burden
of persuasion for both of these elements, but for an affirmative defense,
the employer-defendant bears the burden. Thus, allowing the affirmative
defense in this context may have the effect of lowering the standard for
constructive discharge claims and shifting the burden of persuasion for
two elements of constructive discharge to the employer. Reed is a perfect
example of this. The Reed court should have upheld summary judgment
for MBNA on the constructive discharge claim because the Reed was not
reasonable in feeling compelled to leave in 1999 since she had not re-
ported Appel's actions to management. Instead, without even seriously
considering the merits of the constructive discharge claim, the court over-
turned summary judgment for MBNA because it had not met its burden
of persuasion on the second element of the affirmative defense.
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to decide whether con-
structive discharge constitutes a tangible employment action.5 1 Applying
Ellerth's definition, constructive discharge is clearly more similar to a tan-
gible employment action than to a simple hostile work environment.
Moreover, the court should not be reluctant to not allow the affirmative
defense because either the intent standard, the negligence standard, or
the aided in the agency relation standard noted in Ellerth will always be
met. Finally, provided that the standard for constructive discharge is set
sufficiently high, employers need not fear that the lack of the affirmative
defense would lead to greater liability because the plaintiff-employee will
rightly bear the burden of persuasion, rather than the defendant-em-
ployer bearing the burden of proving the affirmative defense.
51. See Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 803 (Dec. 1, 2003) (No. 03-95).
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